Abstract. The aim of this paper is to investigate determinants of audit delay. Audit delay is measured as the length of time (i.e. the number of calendar days) from the scal year-end to the audit report date. It is important to understand factors that inuence audit delay since it directly aects the timeliness of nancial reporting. The research is conducted on a sample of Croatian listed companies, covering the period of four years (from 2008 to 2011). We use pooled OLS regression analysis, modelling audit delay as a function of the following explanatory variables: audit rm type, audit opinion, protability, leverage, inventory and receivables to total assets, absolute value of total accruals, company size and audit committee existence. Our results indicate that audit committee existence, protability and leverage are statistically signicant determinants of audit delay in Croatia.
Introduction
Timeliness is an important characteristic of accounting information, since timely reporting provides more decision-useful information. Timeliness enhances both relevant and faithfully represented information, and is therefore an enhancing qualitative characteristic [13] . Audit delay can aect the timeliness of accounting information releases [1] . Moreover, it is considered to be the single most important determinant of the timeliness of the earnings announcement [12] . The audit report date is the date on which the auditor has obtained sucient appropriate audit evidence to support the opinion, including evidence that all nancial statements have been prepared and that the management have asserted that they have taken responsibility for those nancial statements.
The timeliness of nancial reporting is especially important for well functioning of capital markets as it reduces information asymmetry and enhances decisionusefulness of information. Croatian Capital Market Act, Article 403 [25] requires listed companies to make their annual nancial report public (including auditednancial statements and audit report) four months at the latest after the end of the nancial year. Even though regulatory bodies impose certain requirements regarding the nancial reporting timeliness, considerable discretion still remains within the regulatory framework. Timely reporting in emerging markets is of particular importance since in these markets information is relatively limited and has a longer time lag [21] . Also, according to the McGee and Yuan [19] , there is evidence that companies in transition economies issue their nancial statements much later than companies in more developed market economies. In these countries, dierent factors might be important in explaining the audit lag with respect to annual nancial statements. Therefore, this study extends the previous literature on the timeliness of nancial reporting by analysing potential determinants of audit delay in Croatia.
The reminder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section provides a brief literature review. The third section describes research design and variables used in the model. Research results are presented and discussed in Section four.
Finally, the last section summarizes the main ndings of research.
Literature review
Although the issue of timeliness is of great importance to standard setters, the theory in this area is not particularly developed [8, 9] . Still, there are numerous studies that have examined a variety of factors regarding audit delay. The majority of related studies were conducted in the USA and other Anglo-Saxon institutional settings [1, 5, 6, 8, 9, 15, 16] . However, in the recent years the issue has also become popular in other countries with dierent institutional and regulatory settings, like Malaysia [7] , China [19] , Greece [21] , Spain [4] , Turkey [23] , etc. A great interest in researching this issue on international level additionally emphasizes its relevance.
Empirical results show that there exists a great variability among dierent countries with respect to the timelines of nancial reporting and audit reporting lag.
For example, the study of DeCeuster and Trappers [10] found that it takes Belgian companies longer to report their nancial results than companies in Anglo-Saxon countries. Furthermore, prior research has established the importance of a number of variables in explaining audit reporting lag. These factors include, among others, industry and size of the company, protability, gearing, extraordinary items, auditor business risk, audit complexity, audit rm characteristics and audit opinion.
While studies on audit delay share many similarities, they also present peculiarities that dierentiate them [4] . This can be attributed to dierences in observation periods, sample sizes and their compositions, measures of audit reporting lag and related variables, methodological approaches, institutional and regulatory settings.
This also suggests that empirical research broadening the scope of the analysis and integrating many of these considerations may give us a more comprehensive picture of the eects of dierent factors on the timeliness of nancial reporting and audit delay. 
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Research design
Consistent with prior literature [3, 17] , audit delay or audit reporting lag is measured as a function of the number of days that elapse from the closure of the accounting period until the date of the audit report. In order to investigate the association between audit reporting lag and selected independent variables, the following model is developed:
Independent variables included in the model are described in Davies and Whittred [9] oer several arguments for this kind of reasoning: i)
professional auditing standards require that auditors undertake all possible and reasonable steps to issue an unqualied opinion before they can issue a qualied opinion;
ii) auditors do not like to issue qualied opinions to their clients, so it is expected that they will broaden their procedures to resolve any uncertainties; iii) management of a company does not want to receive a qualied audit report, so they are likely to start negotiations with their auditors. All these actions will lead to an increase in the reporting lag.
Variables Protability (ROA), Leverage (Lev), Audit eort (I nvRec) and Absolute level of total accruals (T A) are included in the model to proxy for client complexity and/or engagement risk. Bamber et al. [3] argue that the amount of audit work to be done is an increasing function of the auditor's business risk associated with the client. Business risk will increase if client's nancial position deteriorates.
Both protability and leverage can be used as indicators of client's nancial condition. Less protable companies and companies with a greater amount of debt tend to be associated with nancial distress and hence a greater risk of bankruptcy [6] . On the other hand, protable companies may require auditors to complete audit of their accounts earlier in order to convey the`good news' [1, 6] . Variable InvRec measures audit eort/risk or hand-to-audit asset involving audit time and eort beyond that of other assets. Variable T A is also used as an indicator of audit inherent risk as accruals have a higher risk of error and require more audit eort. Namely, Francis and Krishnan [11] argue audits of high-accrual companies pose more uncertainty than audits of low-accrual companies because of the potential of estimation error and a greater chance that high-accrual companies have undetected asset realization and/or going concern problems related to a higher level of accruals. Since higher levels of accounting accruals increase the risk of information reliability (because they are inherently subjective, linked to future realizations and prone to opportunistic earnings management), a positive relationship between audit delay and the absolute level of total accruals is expected.
Company Size (Size) is a variable commonly used to explain variability in audit delay. Although larger companies have more extensive and complex accounts and may therefore require more time for auditing, empirical research generally supports a negative relationship between audit delay and company size [1, 3, 6, 14, 15] . These ndings can be explained with several arguments. Firstly, large companies face greater external pressure to release the nancial statement promptly [3] and they can also exert more pressure and demand more timely completion of their audits [3, 6, 14] . Moreover, they are likely to have better internal controls, allowing auditors to perform more interim compliance and substantive tests, thereby reducing year-end audit work [20] . Finally, depending on data availability ‡ , the nal sample included 281 company-year observations. Descriptive statistics of analyzed variables is presented in Table 3 .
As can be noticed from Table 3 , mean audit delay is 106 days. Namely, audited information becomes available after a period that ranges from 4 days for the company with the shortest audit delay, up to 208 days for the company with the longest audit delay. Prior studies indicate that the release of annual nancial statements is delayed by the audit function by an average of over 50 days across dierent countries [18] .
Multivariate analysis
Our model is estimated by pooled OLS regression analysis. With panel data, usual OLS standard errors are incorrect unless there is no cluster eect and so robust standard errors that allow cluster correlation (and heteroskedasticity) should be used [24] . Standard errors clustered by a company are unbiased and produce correctly sized condence intervals regardless of the rm eect being permanent or temporary [22] . Consequently, we use White standard errors which are robust to within cluster correlation (i.e. Rogers or clustered standard errors). Also, since many panel data sets have more rms than years, a common approach is to include dummy variables for each time period (to absorb the time eect). If the time eect is xed the time dummies completely remove the correlation between observations in the same time period [22] . Therefore, we use year dummies to account for time-xed eects (F-test for joint signicance is 2.79 with p-value 0.0437). Also, calculated multicollinearity tests suggest that collinearity is not a serious issue (i.e.
variance ination factors are lower than 5).
As Table 4 shows, the F-statistic of the model is signicantly dierent from zero,
indicating that a subset of the explanatory variables does explain the variation in audit delay. [24] . In such studies, the signs, magnitudes, and signicance of the estimated parameters are of primary interest. Regression analysis results are presented in Table 4 . §
The results show that only three variables are statistically signicant in explaining audit delay in Croatia. Namely, audit delay is inversely related to protability (p < 0.05) and directly related to nancial leverage (p < 0.01), which is consistent with the ndings described previously [3, 6] . Moreover, our results provide evidence that the existence of an audit committee is negatively related to audit delay (p < 0.01). This nding emphasizes the importance of a corporate governance mechanism in promoting the timeliness of nancial reporting.
In order to test robustness of our results we estimated the model separately for each year. The results of a separate estimation demonstrate the following: 1) the ‡ The greatest loss of observations was due to non-existence of data regarding an audit committee. § Year dummies are included but not reported for sake of brevity. Prob > F 0.0000 Table 4 : Estimated results by pooled OLS regression
Conclusion
Timeliness is an important and useful characteristic of accounting information.
Thereby, it is of great interest to dierent regulatory bodies and standard setters.
However the timeliness of nancial reporting is directly aected by the length of auditing. Our data indicate that the average audit delay in Croatia is 106 days which is below legal requirements set by the Capital Market Act; however, it is much longer than average audit delay in developed countries. The aim of this study was to analyse the eect of several company and audit related variables on audit delay in Croatia. Our ndings indicate that lower protability and higher indebtedness increase audit reporting lag, while the existence of an audit committee contributes to timely nancial reporting by shortening audit delay. The results of this paper could be of interest not only to academics but also to standard setters and regulators in the process of improvement of the quality of nancial reporting. However, potential limitations of our study are related to a small sample size, sample selection bias and the problem of omitted variables (namely variables that explain dierent corporate governance aspects, institutional setting, audit rm and audit technology characteristics). These limitations can also be used as suggestions for future research.
